Community Matters in China by Adams, Jennifer H
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Gansu Survey of Children and Families Papers Gansu Survey of Children and Families
2006
Community Matters in China
Jennifer H. Adams
Harvard University, jennifer_adams@post.harvard.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/gansu_papers
Part of the Sociology Commons
Adams, J. H. (2006). Community Matters in China. In E. Hannum & B. Fuller (Eds.), Children's Lives and Schooling across Societies (Research in the
Sociology of Education, Volume 15)(pp.15-41). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
© Emerald Group Publishing
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1479-3539(06)15002-8
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/gansu_papers/16
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Adams, Jennifer H., "Community Matters in China" (2006). Gansu Survey of Children and Families Papers. 16.
http://repository.upenn.edu/gansu_papers/16
Community Matters in China
Abstract
In China, a growing awareness that many areas have been left behind during an era characterized by market
reform has raised concerns about the impact of community disadvantage on schooling. In this paper, I
investigate whether villages exert distinct influences on student achievement. Building on these results, I
explore the relationship between student achievement and resources present in the community. Results
indicate that children who live in communities with higher levels of economic and social resources have
higher mathematics scores, on average.
Keywords
China, education, student achievement
Disciplines
Sociology
Comments
Adams, J. H. (2006). Community Matters in China. In E. Hannum & B. Fuller (Eds.), Children's Lives and
Schooling across Societies (Research in the Sociology of Education, Volume 15)(pp.15-41). Emerald Group
Publishing Limited.
© Emerald Group Publishing
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1479-3539(06)15002-8
This book chapter is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/gansu_papers/16
  
COMMUNITY MATTERS IN CHINA 
 
 
Jennifer H. Adams 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In China, a growing awareness that many areas have been left behind during an 
era characterized by market reform has raised concerns about the impact of community 
disadvantage on schooling. In this paper, I investigate whether villages exert distinct 
influences on student achievement. Building on these results, I explore the relationship 
between student achievement and resources present in the community. Results indicate 
that children who live in communities with higher levels of economic and social 
resources have higher mathematics scores, on average.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, researchers have reported a global trend toward the 
decentralization of school finance and management by shifting responsibilities from 
central governments to local communities and schools. This has raised important 
questions about whether differences across communities might be linked with disparities 
in children’s schooling (Bray, 1996; Hanson, 2000).  
Local governments in many nations have become responsible for the provision 
and  administration of basic education, and in turn, are expected to raise their own funds, 
hire their own teachers, and run local schools (Hanson, 2000; Patrinos and Lakshmanan, 
1997; Bray, 1996). In this way, decentralization policies have fashioned community 
schools that are even more local—now tied to community economies, leadership, and 
social organizations (Cheng, 2001). The increasingly local nature of schooling is 
sometimes credited with increasing real national expenditures for education, inspiring 
educational innovation, and encouraging community involvement (Tsang, 1996; Bray, 
1996; Eskeland and Filmer, 2002). But this praise must be tempered by evidence from 
some nations, such as China, that shows concurrent increases in educational inequality 
(Tsang, 1996; Tsang, 2003; Park et al, 2003).  
In China there is a growing awareness that many areas have been left behind 
during an era characterized by market reform, which has raised concerns about the impact 
of community disadvantage on schooling (West and Wong, 1995; Ross and Lin, 2002; 
Adams, 2001; Adams and Hannum, 2005). In recent years, researchers have linked 
community economic indicators to tangible measures of education, such as enrollment 
and the provision of schools (Connelly and Zheng, 2003; Adams, 2001; Park et al, 2003; 
Hannum, 2003). Evidence has also established a connection between both province and 
county-level economic conditions and local investment in education (Park et al, 2003).  
Moreover, recent research indicates that both local revenue and community 
donations vary across provinces, within provinces, and sometimes even within counties 
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(Park et al, 2003; Tsang, 2003). While researchers have successfully documented the 
extent of variation in community financial resources available for schooling in China, 
little is known about whether differences in these economic resources directly influence 
student achievement. Moreover, the connection between social conditions in the 
community and local schooling is poorly understood.  
This paper examines the links between community conditions and student 
achievement in one rural interior province in China. In it I address the following 
questions: First, after controlling for child background, does student achievement depend 
on where the child lives? Second, do children who live in villages with better economic 
and social conditions achieve more? If so, does the effect of social conditions differ 
depending on the economic resources available in the community?  
I begin by describing a framework for understanding the effect of community 
conditions on schooling. Next I describe educational reform during the decentralization 
era in China, in order to provide a backdrop for a synthesis of studies that have linked 
dimensions of communities and educational outcomes in the Chinese context. This is 
followed by a presentation of my data and methodological approach, and concludes with 
an analysis of the findings.  
The results of this study offer additional insights into the linkages between where 
children live and their achievement in school. The data provides empirical evidence of 
the connection between community conditions and local student achievement and also 
the specific dimensions of communities that influence achievement. As educational 
policies focused on decentralization intermingle with the financial limitations of an 
economy in transition, research that reveals significant geographic inequalities becomes 
increasingly important to policymakers in China and abroad who are concerned with 
reducing educational inequality and improving the quality of schooling in poor areas. 
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
The Importance of Place: Understanding the Effect of Communities on Schooling 
 
 
In the last decade, several researchers have linked the socioeconomic and 
structural differences across communities with the individual outcomes of the children 
who live in them (Duncan, 1994; Dornbusch et al, 1991; Garner and Raudenbush, 1991). 
Even more notable is research that suggests that the influence of communities on 
children’s social welfare is separate from family characteristics. For example, Ho and 
Willms’ (1996) study of eighth graders in the United States found that parental 
participation measured at the school level had a positive effect on student achievement, 
net of individual parental participation, indicating that even those children whose parents 
did not participate in school activities achieved higher scores when they went to a school 
where a greater percentage of community parents were involved. Similarly, using data 
from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), Pong (1998) also found that 
strong social networks within a school positively affected mathematics achievement. 
Strikingly, one study of adolescent females which used the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamic suggested that neighborhood effects on school leaving sometimes rivaled the 
influence of family characteristics (Brooks-Gunn et al, 1993).   
 Research also demonstrates that community economic indicators—such as mean 
community income and the percentage of families in poverty—exert distinct effects on 
student achievement (Duncan, 1994). In the United States, several researchers found that 
the presence of affluent neighbors is a significant predictor of school leaving (Brooks-
Gunn et al, 1993; Clark, 1992). In addition, Dornbusch and colleagues (1991) found that 
low neighborhood socioeconomic status has a negative effect on student grades, even 
after controlling for individual family background. Similarly, Binder (1999) explains that 
average community earnings are a significant predictor of desired schooling in Mexico.  
Corman’s (2003) study uses data from four waves of the National Household 
Education Survey to provide evidence that community wealth decreases the probability 
of grade repetition for U.S. students ages 6-15. Children in richer neighborhoods are less 
likely to repeat a grade than children living in poorer neighborhoods. In short, one of the 
most clearly established sources of community disadvantage is economic constraints 
present in the community. 
International studies have documented that schools in many communities are 
constrained by local financing (Bray, 1996; Tsang, 1994). In many nations, communities 
are required to raise funds for schooling to supplement the inadequate funds provided by 
national governments (Bray, 1996). However, faced with a weak tax-base, many local 
governments in poor communities are unable to adequately finance their local schools 
(Bray, 1996). Accordingly, resource-constrained local schools must rely increasingly 
upon local sources of funds generated by community donations, revenue from school 
businesses, and student fees (Cheng, 1994; Ross, 1999; Hannum and Park, 2002). Often, 
poor communities are unable to pay teacher salaries, provide school supplies, or fund the 
costs of basic amenities such as heat and water (Tsang, 1994; Cheng, 1996). In many 
countries as the burden of raising school finances falls increasingly on local 
communities,, local economic resources are likely to become increasingly important 
determinants of local school quality. 
In more recent investigations of community effects, primarily in the United 
States, scholars have extended their explorations of the role community resources play in 
shaping educational advantage and disadvantage beyond issues of local economics to 
consider the social contexts in which children learn. For example, Stanton-Salázar and 
Dornbusch’s (1995) investigation of Mexican high school students in the San Francisco 
area revealed a positive correlation between social networks and academic achievement. 
Similarly, in their study of at-risk youth, Furstenberg and Hughes (1995) find that social 
capital, broadly defined, is positively associated with socioeconomic success in early 
adulthood. Coleman and Hoffer (1987) also credit differences in the social capital of the 
communities surrounding schools with the extant existing differences in student 
achievement that we observe between public and Catholic schools.  
In explaining how the presence of social capital might influence student 
performance in school, Coleman (1988) contributed the concept of  “intergenerational 
closure,” or the relationship of an individual student’s parents with their children’s 
friends’ parents. Coleman explains that when parents are in relationships with other 
parents, they are more likely to exchange information that may foster children’s 
schooling. The following example illustrates how intergenerational closure may operate. 
Suppose two students develop a plan to avoid studying for a test: one student tells her 
mother she is studying at the other child’s home and vice versa. Instead of studying, the 
two students are actually at a third child’s home listening to a new CD. However, if the 
children’s parents know each other and communicate regularly, the children’s ruse will 
be uncovered quickly— perhaps even in time for their parents to get the children to study 
for the test. In this way, intergenerational closure helps parents garner the information 
needed to enforce norms and shape expectations about schooling. 
The results from empirical examinations linking intergenerational closure with 
educational outcomes have been mixed. Consistent with the illustration provided, 
Sandefur and Lauman (1998) found that information about their children’s efforts and 
successes at school can help parents influence their children to engage with school. 
Similarly, using the 1988 NELS data, Carbonaro (1998) found that intergenerational 
closure is positively associated with both student math achievement and school retention. 
However, a more recent investigation of the 1988 NELS data that treats social capital as a 
collective asset indicates that intergenerational closure in public schools is negatively 
associated with gains in mathematics achievement when controlling for friendship 
density (Morgan and Sørenson, 1999). These researchers argue that it is friendships 
between students rather than parents of students that positively influences learning.  
Taken as a whole, the existing literature on community effects suggests that the 
differences in educational outcomes across communities may arise from various 
characteristics and processes operating at the community level. First, local economic 
resources influence enrollment, attainment, and achievement. The reviewed research 
emphasizes that it is not only the economic resources at home that matter, but also the 
average wealth of the surrounding families. Community economic resources may 
influence educational outcome by shaping the quality of local schooling. In addition, 
community wealth affects the quality of after-school activities available to community 
youth—activities that also affect aspirations, effort, and learning. Second, the extent and 
quality of community social relationships influence the ways communities shape 
expectations, share information, and enforce rules. In this way, communities with more 
social resources are more likely to influence student behavior and beliefs both in and out 
of the classroom.1  
   
Educational Reform During Decentralization Era China 
 
Nearly two decades of decentralization reforms have made China an informative 
case study for investigating the relationship between community resources and schooling. 
The shift of financial responsibilities from the central government to local levels was the 
foundation of the country’s decentralization reforms in education (Cheng, 1996). Based 
on the Decision on the Reform of the Educational Structure in 1985, local governments 
were given the responsibility for raising and spending educational revenue. In practice, 
the state retained control of curriculum and teacher development, but withdrew its 
financial and administrative commitments. This decision was strengthened by several 
educational policies published in the 1990s, which reaffirmed the state’s commitment to a 
more decentralized system with a more diversified resource base.2 Typically, provincial 
governments are now responsible for the provision of higher education, county 
governments finance and manage secondary schools, and villages pay for and run 
primary schools.  
 As a result of these policies, local governments were required not only to raise 
their own funds for schools, but also to mobilize nongovernmental and community 
resources. First, schools were encouraged to set up school-run enterprises, such as 
orchards, bakeries, or bicycle repair shops. By 1993, school-run enterprises were 
generating 5.4% of the total national expenditure on education (Tsang, 1996). Next, 
schools were encouraged to solicit social contributions from local citizens and businesses. 
And finally, many schools made up the difference between their revenue and costs by 
charging a variety of school fees (Paine, 1998; Bray, 1996; Tsang, 1994). In this way, 
decentralization may be responsible for the increasingly local nature of Chinese 
schooling, now tied to local economies and social organizations.  
 
Community Resources and Schooling in Rural China 
 
Not surprisingly, scholars who study schooling in China have also discovered 
connections between economic resource constraints in the community and educational 
disadvantage (World Bank, 1992; Connelly and Zheng, 2003; Adams and Hannum, 
2005). Connelly and Zheng (2003) demonstrate that school enrollment is directly linked 
to county per capita income. Furthermore, their results indicate that community 
circumstances affect enrollment even when family background is taken into account.  
Adams’ (2001) examination of children in the early 1990s reveals a positive 
relationship not only between village wealth and enrollment, but also between village 
wealth and children’s rate of progress through school. Adams and Hannum’s study 
(2005) illustrates that village infrastructure is also important in the provision of social 
services. Perhaps more telling, children who live in communities where village 
enterprises contribute financial resources to schools are always more likely to be enrolled 
in school. Although this research empirically links community resources and education in 
rural China, it is limited by both an emphasis on enrollment probabilities and a narrow 
definition of community conditions. 
Few studies have sought to link local economic differences to children’s 
experiences once they are in school. Policies that have emphasized both financial 
decentralization and the expansion of compulsory education taken together with data 
limitations have resulted in research focused on determining whether community effects 
only predict enrollment. In recent years, some researchers have widened the scope of 
their investigations by exploring the connections between community resources and a 
more complex outcome, grade-for-age student attainment (Adams, 2001; Adams and 
Hannum, 2005).  
Another strand of research focuses on the connection between community 
differences and indicators of school quality, such as educational expenditure. For 
example, Park, Li, and Wang’s study (2003) of school equity in rural China reveals that 
village income per capita is positively associated with both the percentage of qualified 
teachers in the village and the percentage of students with desks and chairs. Yet their 
research falls short of establishing how these differences across villages affect what 
children learn in school. A knowledge gap exists concerning the influence that 
communities exert on achievement once children are enrolled in village schools. A more 
detailed understanding of the ways in which local community resources affect student 
achievement is particularly needed now as school enrollment rates rise in China’s poor 
interior and educational policy refocuses on issues of quality.  
Even less well established are the particular facets of communities that influence 
children’s experiences in school. Previous research in the Chinese context has linked 
general indicators of economic development, such as village per capita income or the 
presence of electricity to improved educational outcomes (Adams, 2001; Adams and 
Hannum, 2005). However, this work is limited by a narrow definition of community that 
captures only the most basic economic characteristics in a village and overlooks the 
social resources available for cultivating education. Two notable exceptions are the 
research of Connelly and Zheng (2003), who constructed a variable to represent 
community norms for education, and the qualitative investigations of Ross and Lin 
(2002), who reveal the importance of communities’ ability to use social networks to bring 
together resources to support local schools. 
On this foundation, individuals in some villages may benefit from the existence of 
community norms that support education. For example, in some communities pressure to 
enforce child labor laws could encourage children to stay in school and work hard rather 
than to drop out and seek employment. Connelly and Zheng (2003) found that positive 
community norms for education, as measured by the proportion of village children in 
school, positively affected educational outcomes for children in the village. Similarly, 
some villages have links to social organizations in other communities that they use to 
generate both financial and human resources for local schools (Ross and Lin, 2002). For 
instance, rural schools that have relationships with schools in more prosperous areas 
sometimes “borrow” qualified teachers for a term to improve the skills of local teachers 
(Lee and Li, 1994). In this way the strength of social networks—both within and outside 
some communities—may contribute to the sharing of information or behavior that 
furthers student achievement.  
 In summary, this study addresses some of the limitations of previous research and 
makes several new contributions to understanding the influence of community resources 
on schooling in rural China. First, this is the first study of rural China that links 
differences across communities with variation in student achievement, rather than 
enrollment or attainment. Second, by utilizing village and school-level data, I extend my 
analysis beyond basic indicators of village economic level to the actual differences in 
school revenue garnered within the village. Third, drawing on social capital theory and 
specifically Coleman’s concept of intergenerational closure, I test empirically whether 
social relationships in the community matter for student achievement. Each of the above 
contributions is possible because of a rich data set collected during the summer of 2000 
in rural Gansu Province, China. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
Data: Gansu Survey of Children and Families 
 
To examine community influences on children’s schooling outcomes in rural 
China, I use data from the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF-1), a multi-
level survey of children aged 9-12 , which was conducted during the summer of 2000 in 
100 villages in Gansu province. Gansu, located in China’s northwest, embodies the 
geographic diversity and poor economic conditions that characterize China’s interior 
provinces. Poverty rates are high and economic growth is slow (Gansu Statistics 
Yearbook, 2001). Although rural industries have slowly emerged, for the most part 
residents are employed in subsistence farming. The average annual per capita income of 
rural residents was only 63% of the national average in 2000 (Gansu Statistics Yearbook, 
2001). The illiteracy rate, approximately 14%, is more than double the national average 
in China (Gansu Statistical Yearbook, 2001). 
Most children in Gansu attend primary school in their village. Provincial 
educational statistics indicate that nearly 99% of school-aged children are enrolled in 
school (Gansu Educational Statistics Yearbook, 2000). However, this figure masks the 
numerous children who start school late and drop out early. Many children leave school 
because of health problems or financial constraints, only to enroll again another time. 
Poor families often lack the resources to pay school fees (Hannum and Park, 2002; Bray 
et al, 2004). In addition, persistent poverty negatively affects children’s health and 
nutrition, and in turn, their ability to regularly attend and learn in school.3 Moreover, in 
some communities, children leave school because of general attitudes towards schooling. 
For example, if enrollment rates in a particular community are generally low, families 
who do not choose to send their children to school are not considered unusual, and in 
turn, are not pressured by other village members to support schooling (Bray et al, 2004).  
In this setting, schools also reflect poverty. While most rural villages have a local 
primary school, many rural villages lack the capacity to raise the funds required to 
adequately fund education. Funds collected locally, including student fees, pay for nearly 
all school expenses (Bray et al, 2004). Many teachers in Gansu have little training or 
access to professional support. Even more alarming, it is common for teacher wages to be 
three months late.  
The GSCF-1 examines children’s schooling, achievement, and welfare in the 
context of rural poverty by integrating a primary sample of 2000 children with secondary 
samples of children’s mothers, homeroom teachers, school principals, and village leaders. 
In addition, a teacher questionnaire was administered to all teachers in schools attended 
by sample children;providing a sample of more than 1,000 primary school teachers. The 
random multi-stage  cluster design was employed at each stage draws children from 
village lists of school-aged children in selected villages. Achievement tests in 
mathematics or Chinese language, designed by specialists at the Gansu Educational 
Commission, were administered to all children in the sample. On a random basis, half of 
the children were administered the mathematics examination; the remaining half were 
administered the Chinese language examination. Different exams were administered to 
children in grades 3 and below and to children in grades 4 and above to ensure that the 
tests assessed an appropriate range of knowledge.  
 
Analytic Sample 
 
This study used an analytic sample of 436 students in grades 1-3, all of whom 
were given the mathematics exam. All of the students also attended school in their own 
village.4 This sample was chosen to address both methodological and substantive 
concerns. First, I limit the study to the children who were administered the mathematics 
exam.5 Within this group of students, some of the students were administered the math 
exam for children in grades 1-3, and some were given the exam for grades 4 and above. 
Accordingly, I exclude the children in grades 4 and above.  Next, in an attempt to find out 
more about whether community resources influence schooling at the local village school, 
I limited the sample in two additional ways. I excluded villages with more than one 
primary school.6  I also restricted the sample to children who attended school in their own 
village.7 Children who were enrolled at boarding schools or attended a school in another 
village were not included in the sample. 
 
Measurement 
  
This investigation focuses on a subset of questionnaire items that measure 
individual level and village level characteristics. The data was collected through 
questionnaires administered to the children, their mothers, the village leaders, and also 
through village primary school instruments.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analyses. 
The student level data consists of controls for the children’s socioeconomic background 
and other factors that are hypothesized to affect learning. The village level data includes 
variables detailing the economic and social resources in the village, as well as controls 
for village population and topography. Table 1 also contains data on student mathematics 
achievement. 
This paper examines the effect of community on children’s achievement in 
mathematics as measured by a test developed by the Gansu Educational Commission. 
The test, which was scored on a scale of 0-100, was developed to examine an appropriate 
range of the primary school curriculum for students in first, second, and third grades. The 
mathematics exam scores in the analytic sample range from 0-99, with an average score 
of 42.44. As expected, the average score for second grade students of 29.91 is higher than 
the average score for first grade students of 15.54. Similarly, the mean score for third 
graders of 59.64 was higher than scores for students in grades one and two. 
Child background measures included as controls include a categorical 
representative of students’ grades in school and the children’s ages, which range from 7-
13. Because previous research findings reveal that girls may experience more constraints 
to schooling in rural China (Hannum, 1998; Zhang, 1998), I also include student gender 
(coded 0 if female and 1 if  male) as a control predictor. As indicated in Table 1, 49% of 
the analytic sample, or 214 students, are female. Family wealth is also included as a 
control predictor because of previous research that connects financial resources in the 
home to schooling in rural China (Brown and Park, 2003; Adams, 2001). The sample 
average value for the log of family wealth is 8.95 with a standard deviation of 0.94.  
In addition, I include two predictors to control for children’s opportunity to learn. 
The first is the variable, absent, that captures the number of days a child has missed 
school during the previous semester. The average number of days absent in the sample is 
less than one, indicating that many students do not miss much schooling at all. However, 
as suggested by a standard deviation that is more than three times as large as the mean, 
there is large variation in days absent across children. For the students who have missed 
school during the semester, the number of days absent ranges from 1 to 8.  These 
absences may limit children’s opportunity to learn, and in turn, influence their 
achievement. I also control for the number of books that the family purchased that 
semester, as an indicator of support for education in the home. Books in the home can be 
regarded as a form of cultural capital in the family. Hannum and Park (2001) found that 
the presence of books in the home supports the child’s educational aspirations and 
academic confidence. 
 Table 1 also contains descriptive statistics on the village-level variables selected 
to control for the effect of community when estimating differences in student 
achievement in mathematics. In this study I control for both village population and 
village topography. Finally, the majority of village primary schools do not receive 
financing from the government; rather they rely completely on financial resources 
collected at the village level. In my analytic sample, 32 schools (less than half) received 
some funding from the government.8 I control for the presence of these funds by 
including the log of per pupil expenditure from government funds as a predictor in my 
analyses. This variable varies widely, ranging from 1-125 yuan.  
Most importantly, Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics on two carefully 
selected village-level question predictor variables—economic resources and social 
resources. Based on research findings that suggest the increasing importance of 
community economic resources for local schools (Adams, 2001; Adams and Hannum, 
2005; Park et al, 2003; Tsang, 2003), I use the log of per pupil expenditure from 
nongovernmental or extrabudgetary resources to represent community economic 
resources.9  For example, Park, Li, and Wang’s research (2003) indicates that 
extrabudgetary financing increased during the mid- and late-1990s.  
To capture the effect of social resources in the community, I draw on the work of 
James Coleman (1988, 1991) in creating a variable to represent “community closure.” 
Coleman identified the concept of “intergenerational closure,” which can be defined as 
the relationship of an individual student’s parents with the parents of their children’s 
friends. In the Gansu Survey of Children and Families, mothers were asked if they knew 
the parents of their children’s friends. I use the average response of mothers in the village 
to this question to capture “the community closure” in the village. This variable ranges 
from 0 to 1, with villages that score closer to 0 having less social capital and villages with 
scores closer to 1 having more social capital. As displayed in Table 1, the average score 
is 0.73. In communities with more social capital, more parents know the parents of their 
children’s’ friends, and as a result can garner information about school related matters, 
shape and share behavioral norms, and monitor child behavior.  
 
Analytic Strategy 
 
The following analysis presents figures accompanied by regression analyses of 
student math achievement. In the first set of fitted regression models presented in this 
paper, I use a fixed effects analysis to examine whether there is an overall relationship 
between student mathematics achievement and the village in which the student lives, net 
of  family poverty and other individual characteristics. After controlling for selected child 
and family characteristics, I ask whether children who live in some villages in Gansu 
have higher mathematics achievement than children who live in other villages, on 
average. To conduct this fixed effects analysis, I regress the student mathematics 
outcome on a system of 85 dummy variables, V1 thorough V85, representing the 85 
different villages in the analytic sample, controlling for individual-level variables. In this 
model, each group of children who live in the same village shares a unique intercept 
parameter or “village fixed effect.” An examination of the heterogeneity among these 
distinct intercepts indicates whether villages differ in students’ mathematics achievement, 
on average, controlling for child background. The hypothesized fixed-effects model is as 
follows: 
ijij VVMATH εδββ +Ζ++= 858511 K  
 
for the ith student in the jth village. Regression parameters β1 through β85 represent the 
main effects of the village fixed effects, and the δ coefficient represents the effect of the 
vector of control variable, Ζ, and ε is the usual regression residual. I fit this model to my 
data using OLS multiple regression analysis to estimate and test model parameters. I 
begin by estimating the model containing only the student-level control predictors. Next, 
I estimate a model containing the system of village dummies. I compare models on the 
overall goodness of fit, using the R-squared statistic. Additionally, I use a general linear 
hypothesis test to test a joint null hypothesis that the regression parameters, β1 through 
β85, the village fixed-effects, were simultaneously equal. Rejecting this joint null 
hypothesis will indicate that the community where a child lives does affect math 
achievement, and consequently sets the stage for a second phase of the analysis in which 
I investigate what kind of community characteristics affect the village effects. 
 In the second set of hypothesized regression models, I explore the effect of 
community economic and social resources on student mathematics achievement by 
replacing the fixed effects of village by their equivalent random effects, and including 
selected predictors that describe the presence of community level resources in a new 
taxonomy of fitted regression models. In these analyses I ask, on average, do children 
who live in villages with higher levels of economic and social resources have higher math 
achievement, controlling for child background? I fit these models using GLS regression 
analysis in order to account for the random effects of village now residing in the 
residuals. I use GLS regression and a multi-level model because standard OLS regression 
analysis does not account naturally for the nesting of the students within village. An 
examination of the estimated coefficients associated with each of the community-level 
main effects then indicates whether the selected community resources influence 
mathematics achievement in Gansu, net of child background. An example of a typical 
random effects model is: 
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where MATH
 
is the math achievement score for the ith child in the jth village. γ00 
represents the estimated average math score in the population providing all variables are 
centered on their grand mean, γ01, γ02, γ03….are regression parameters representing the 
main effects of community level predictors on student achievement, and γ10, γ20, γ30…are 
the regression parameters associated with individual level control variables. Residual ε
 
is 
the unique error term associated with student i in village j and u
 
is a random effect, 
representing the common unobserved characteristics that distinguish village j.  
I begin by fitting the model containing the student-level controls. Next, I fit 
several models that include predictor variables that represent community economic and 
social resources. Models are compared on overall goodness of fit, using the R-squared 
statistic. A statistically significant and positive coefficient associated with any of the 
community-level variables (γ01, γ02, γ03…) demonstrates that children who live in villages 
with higher levels of that particular community characteristic are associated with higher 
mathematics scores, on average, taking into account the other community and individual 
characteristics in the model.  
Then I fit a final model to examine the interaction between village economic 
resources and village social resources. A statistically significant coefficient on the 
interaction term reveals that the effect of social resources on student mathematics 
achievement differs according to the economic resources present in the village. For 
example, the effect of social capital may be more pronounced in villages with less 
economic resources. Alternatively, the coefficient on the interaction term may not be 
significant, indicating that the effect of social and economic resources may be additive.  
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
  
The average mathematics exam scores in the analytic sample is 42.44. The scores 
vary widely, as suggested by the range from 0-99 and a standard deviation of nearly 28. 
Figure 1 provides a schematic plot illustrating variation in average unadjusted village 
mathematics scores by grade. Not surprisingly, the figure suggests that average math 
scores vary widely across villages even when we take grade into account. For example, 
average village mathematic scores range across 83 points for first and second graders, 
and 86 points for third graders. An examination of the interquartile ranges for students in 
grades one, two, and three also illustrates the extent of the variation in average 
mathematics scores across villages. For first graders, the middle 50% of average village 
mathematics scores also spread widely, falling between 26 points of each other, from 
approximately 3 to 29 points. Among second and third grade students, the interquartile 
range is not as large, or approximately 23 points, as among first graders, yet it continues 
to demonstrate ample variation in average village mathematics scores.  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In order to determine whether there is an overall relationship between student 
mathematics achievement and the village in which the student lives, we now turn to 
regression analysis, and examine the fixed effects of villages on student mathematics 
achievement. 
  
Examining  mathematics achievement across rural villages in Gansu: Does it matter 
where a child lives? 
Table 2 displays the parameter estimates for a selection of fitted models 
predicting the influence of where a child lives on student mathematics achievement, 
controlling for child socioeconomic background, days absent from school, and the 
number of books purchased that semester.   
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Model 1 controls only for the individual characteristics of the student. This fitted 
model suggests that the only statistically significant student level predictor of math 
achievement included in the fitted model represents the student’s grade in school. In 
addition, in this model, only 40% of the variation in mathematics achievement is 
predicted by the student level characteristics, leaving a substantial portion of the variation 
unexplained. 
Model 2 presents the results of a fixed effects regression analysis in which student 
mathematics achievement is predicted by a system of dummy variables representing 
villages, controlling for student background and other individual characteristics. Most of 
the student-level control predictors that represent student socioeconomic background 
continue to show the same relationship as in fitted Model 1. In addition, however, the 
results in Model 2 suggest that student mathematics achievement depends on both school 
attendance and books purchased in the last semester. All else being equal, each day a 
student was absent in the last semester is associated with a decline of 2.1 points in the 
mathematics test score, on average. Like students who usually attend school, children 
who have purchased more books in the last semester are likely to have higher 
mathematics achievement. Perhaps most importantly, all else being equal, the village in 
which a child lives influences his or her mathematics score.  
But what is the magnitude of the differences in average mathematics achievement 
across villages? After controlling for the effect of student background, I found that the 
estimated variance of the estimated village fixed effects is 239.5. However, to provide a 
more reliable estimate of the magnitude of these differences, I need to take into account 
measurement error in the village-specific fixed effects displayed in Table 2.1.10 After for 
controlling for student background and adjusting for measurement error, I found that the 
estimated variance of the true village effects is 153.1. Thus, one standard deviation 
difference in the true village effects is associated with an estimated difference in student 
mathematics achievement of approximately 12 points. These results support my 
hypothesis that where a child lives matters, and suggest that differences in village level 
characteristics influence student mathematics achievement. In the next section, I 
investigate whether economic and social resources in the village affect individual student 
achievement. 
 
Do children who live in communities with higher levels of economic and social resources 
achieve higher mathematics scores? 
 
In the fitted models presented in Table 3, I replaced the village fixed effects 
present in the previous taxonomy of models with their equivalent random effects, and 
added selected predictors to represent village characteristics to the regression models. I 
continued to control for the individual characteristics of the child and also take into 
account the village population, village topography, and per pupil expenditure from 
government funds. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
In Model 3, I include the log of per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental or 
extrabudgetary resources to represent community economic resources. The coefficient on 
this variable indicates that students who live in villages that have higher per pupil 
expenditures from extrabudgetary, or locally-generated, resources have higher 
mathematics scores on average, controlling for student characteristics and other village 
characteristics with the exception of  village social capital. The coefficient on the log of 
per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental funds in Model 5, which controls for village 
social capital, is only slightly different from the coefficient in Model 3, indicating that 
this measure of village economic resources exerts a distinct influence on student 
achievement, and operates separately from the effect of the measure of village social 
resources. 
Models 4 and 5 display the effect of village social capital as measured by 
“community closure.” The coefficient on this variable in Model 4 indicates that on 
average, children who live in villages with higher levels of social capital, or where more 
mothers know the parents of her child’s friends, children have higher mathematics scores, 
controlling for individual and village characteristics. The coefficient on community 
closure in Model 5, which also controls for a measure of village economic resources—
namely the log of per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental funds—is nearly identical 
to the coefficient on this variable in Model 4, indicating that the effect of village social 
capital remains the same even when accounting for village economic resources. 
The fitted models presented in Table 3 lead to two important findings. First, on 
average, children who live in communities that have a higher per pupil expenditure from 
nongovernmental resources have higher mathematics achievement, net of controls. 
Similarly, children who live in villages with a higher level of community closure, i.e., 
where more parents know the parents of their children’s friends, have higher mathematics 
scores on average. These findings support the hypothesis that differences in economic 
and social resources at the community level partially explain the difference across 
villages in mathematics achievement. 
The specific effects of village economic and social resources can be better 
appreciated in Figure 2, which illustrates fitted math achievement as a function of per 
pupil expenditure from nongovernmental resources and community closure. In this plot, 
child background and other village level characteristics remain constant. The figure 
shows the estimated mathematics achievement for a female student, age 10, in grade 3, 
who has not been absent from school in the last semester, and who purchased the mean 
number of books during this period. She lives in a small village in the mountains or 
plains and her school, like many village primary schools, does not receive funding from 
the state. Village social capital, as measured by community closure, is displayed on the 
horizontal axis with a scale of 0 to 1; villages that are closer to 1 have more social capital. 
The four sloping lines represent prototypical students in villages at the quartiles for per 
pupil expenditure from nongovernmental resources. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 2 shows that there is a positive relationship between village social capital 
and math achievement when per pupil expenditure is held constant. All else being equal, 
the data shows that villages with more social capital have higher mathematics scores. For 
example, in a village with low per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental resources 
and low village social capital (0.3), a child could have an estimated math score of 42 
points. If the same child lived in a village with average social capital (0.73), her score 
would be six points higher, and if she lived in a village with high levels of social capital it 
would be even higher. 
The prototypical fitted plot in Figure 2 also displays the effect of village 
economic resources. When we hold village social capital constant, the gaps between the 
sloping lines represent the effect of per pupil expenditure. For example, in a village 
where social capital is average (0.73), a child might have an estimated mathematics score 
of 48 points, net of other controls, if she lived in a village with low per pupil expenditure 
from nongovernmental resources. If the same child lived in the same type of village, but 
one with high (top quartile) per pupil expenditure, her estimated mathematics score 
would be 59 points,  or a difference of 11 points between the poorest and wealthiest 
villages. 
The effect of village resources is even more striking if we compare the differences 
in estimated mathematics achievement between a child who lives in a village with the 
highest levels of social and economic resources with a comparable child who lives in a 
village with the lowest levels of social and economic resources. The gap in estimated 
mathematics achievement is 21 points.  
 
Does the effect of village social capital differ depending on the economic resources 
available in the community?  
The final question posed in this paper examines whether the effect of village 
social capital operates differently on student mathematics achievement depending on the 
village economic resources. Model 6 in Table 3 sheds light on this hypothesis by 
interacting community closure with the per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental 
(i.e., community generated) funds. As displayed in Model 6, the coefficient associated 
with the interaction term is not significant, suggesting that the effect of village social 
capital, as measured by community closure, was not conditioned by the economic 
resources in the village. In other words, village social capital exerted the same effect on 
student mathematics achievement regardless of whether the student lived in a village with 
more or less economic resources.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Community Matters: Where a Child Lives and the Resources Present  
in the Village Influence Student Achievement 
 
The results presented in this paper reveal important new insights regarding the 
relationship between communities and schooling in rural China. One of the most striking 
findings is that where a child lives definitely affects student achievement. There are large 
differences across villages in average mathematics achievement.  In addition, these 
analyses reveal that the differences in educational outcomes across communities arise, at 
least in part, from specific characteristics and processes operating at the village level. In 
other words, economic and social resources in the village influence student achievement. 
 More specifically, children who live in villages with higher per pupil expenditures 
from nongovernmental resources have higher mathematics scores, on average, even when 
taking individual background and other village characteristics into account. In this way, 
the economic resources available to spend on schooling in a particular village may 
influence educational outcomes by shaping school quality. This finding resonates with 
the concerns expressed by children and parents in rural Gansu during interviews. One 
child said that the problem with his school is that it didn’t have any money. He went on 
to explain, “Our village doesn’t have any money, so there’s no money to go to the 
school.” Villages with more economic resources may have a higher percentage of 
qualified teachers working at the village school and a higher percentage of students with 
adequate materials for learning.  In addition, community economic resources may also 
affect the quality of after-school activities available for children in the community and 
may, in turn, indirectly shape student aspirations, effort, and attitudes about schooling. 
 An additional avenue of community influence is social relationships. These 
results indicate that net of  child background and other village characteristics, children 
who were living in communities where a greater number of parents knew the parents of 
their children’s friends had higher math scores, on average. It is important to note that it 
is probably not the actual friendships between parents that affect student achievement. 
Rather,  children who live in this kind of community may be advantaged by the support, 
guidance, and common values created by these relationships among parents.  
This finding also echoes the explanations provided by Gansu parents during 
interviews. When parents described their conversations with other parents, they talked 
about collaborating on common rules for their children, such as having the children finish 
all of their homework before they can play. In addition, they talked about how they 
should reprimand village children who didn’t follow these guidelines. One mother 
recounted the story of a time when one of her daughter’s friends was not studying well or 
paying attention in class. The woman called the young girl to her house and told the child 
“to focus on studying and not to play too much…..or she would not test into junior high.” 
In this way, social pressure from parents helps to promote behavior that may improve 
student achievement in some villages. Interestingly, this study’s results indicate that in 
the case of rural China, the effect of village social and economic resources are additive 
rather than interactive. Village social capital effects did not vary according to the 
economic resources present in the village.  
As in many other parts of the world, community matters for children’s schooling 
in rural China. This paper demonstrates that village differences in the economic and 
social resources available to support local schools have consequences for the students 
who live in these communities and attend village schools. The decentralization of school 
funding and management has served to create schools that are increasingly local 
institutions, reflecting the economic and social resources of the communities they are a 
part of. As schools become more local, they also become more diverse, reflecting 
different levels of economic resources to draw on, different kinds of  physical 
infrastructure to facilitate schooling, and different social resources to mobilize. Cross-
community inequality is linked to the quality of village schools, and ultimately student 
achievement.  
 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1
 Despite the findings described above, the conclusion that communities “matter” is not reached without 
difficulty. One frequently argued problem when discussing community effects in the United States is that 
people are not randomly assigned to their neighborhood. Instead, similar types of people tend to choose or 
                                                                                                                                                 
self-select into the same communities—the Tiebout process. However, this process of choice is not relevant 
in rural China where geographic mobility is extremely restricted.  
 
2
 Please see Central Committee of the Community Party, 1993 Education Law (Jiao yu fa) Beijing, (1993); 
and Central Committee of the Community Party, 1995 Education Law (Jiao yu fa) Beijing, (1995). 
 
3
 For example, many children in Gansu consume low levels of nutrients which affect cognitive 
development, such as Vitamin A, iron, and zinc. See Emily Hannum and Albert Park, “Educating China’s 
Rural Children in the 21st Century.” 
 
4
 This sample size provides me with sufficient statistical power (>.80) to detect small effects at the usual 
levels of Type I error (Light, et al, 1991). 
 
5
 Previous research indicates that mathematics is more sensitive to differences in school characteristics than 
language achievement. See Richard J. Murnane, “The Impact of School Resources on Inner City Children.” 
 
6
 For example, some communities have an incomplete primary school, serving children in grades 1-4, and a 
complete primary school, enrolling students in grades 1-6. Due to data limitations, I cannot determine how 
the village allocates financial resources between these schools. Eight villages were dropped from the 
sample because they had more than one village primary school. As a result, 47 children were excluded from 
the analytic sample.  
 
7
 China has a system of residency laws that require most children to attend schools in their official 
residences. However, most children walk to school, and so may attend school in a neighboring village if it 
is closer to their home. Similarly, some children attend boarding schools if their homes are so remote that 
they are unable to commute to school daily. Due to these circumstances, I excluded 16 children from the 
analysis.  
 
8
 The variable representing the funds received by village schools from the state (GOV) was missing for 
31% of villages. I regressed 15 variables from the village and village school surveys on GOV. These 
variables are described in Table A6 in Appendix (6). The R2 statistic from the regression was .97, 
indicating that the variables included in the regression explain 97% of the variation in GOV. Given the high 
R2 statistic, I decided that using the imputed values would result in estimates that were less biased than 
either excluding the cases with missing data or using the mean value of GOV to replace the missing values. 
 
9
 The variable representing the funds received by village schools from the villages, social organization, 
school’s own revenue, and donations from students, teachers, and officials (NONGOV) was missing for 
45.2% of villages. I regressed 27 variables from the village and village school surveys on NONGOV. These 
variables are described in Table A7 in Appendix (7). The R2 statistic from the regression was .88, 
indicating that the variables included in the regression explain 88% of the variation in NONGOV. Given 
the high R2 statistic, I decided that using the imputed values would result in estimates that were less biased 
than either excluding the cases with missing data or using the mean value of NONGOV to replace the 
missing values. 
 
10
 In order to adjust for measurement error and estimate the variance of the true village effects, I fit a 
random-effects model, and found that the estimated variance of the true village effects is 153.1. I used a 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test to test the null hypothesis that the variance of the true fixed-
effects is zero. The estimated variance of the village fixed-effects is 239.5, which is considerably higher 
than the estimated true variance obtained from the random-effects model. Thus, the estimated reliability of 
the measurement of the village fixed-effects is 0.64. 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for 436 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 3
rd
 Graders in 85 villages in Gansu 
Province, China 
Data Source: GSCF-1, 2000 
Variable 
 
Mean Standard Deviation N 
OUTCOME VARIABLE 
 MATH (Grades 1-3) 42.99 (27.92) 436 
 
STUDENT-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES 
 0.14 (0.34) 436 
 0.38 (0.49) 436 
 
GRADE 1 
GRADE 2 
GRADE 3 0.48 (0.50) 436 
 10.04 (0.95) 436 
 
AGE 
AGE-SQUARED 101.77 (19.48) 436 
 GENDER (FEMALE=0, MALE=1) 0.51 (0.50) 436 
 LOG FAMILY WEALTH 8.946 (0.901) 436 
 DAYS ABSENT 0.32 (1.04) 436 
 BOOKS 17.82 (14.95) 436 
     
VILLAGE-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES 
 VILLAGE POPULATION 1574.62 (796.13) 85 
 TOPOGRAPHY (HILLY=1) 0.20 (0.40) 85 
  LOG GOVT PER PUPIL EXP. 
 
1.082 (1.507) 85 
VILLAGE-LEVEL PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
 LOG NON-GOVT PER PUPIL EXP 1.521 (1.521) 85 
 VILLAGE SOCIAL CAPITAL (0-1) 0.73 (0.20) 85 
 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 1. Variation in Village Mathematic Achievement, Represented by 
Village-Specific Intercepts, (nvillage=85, nstudents =436).  
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TABLE 2. Regression of Student Mathematics Achievement on Socioeconomic Controls and 
Village Fixed Effects (n students=436; n villages=85) 
Data Source: GSCF-1, 2000 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 
STUDENT-LEVEL SOCIOECONOMIC CONTROL PREDICTORS 
 GRADE 2 14.381*** 17.187*** 
 GRADE 3 44.988*** 48.716*** 
 AGE -20.910 0.848 
 AGE-SQUARED 0.999 -0.048 
 GENDER -0.680 -0.013 
 LOG FAMILY WEALTH 1.884 1.537 
 DAYS ABS -0.569 -2.159* 
 BOOKS 0.061 0.158* 
   
VILLAGE FIXED EFFECTS   
 VILLAGE 1  32.624** 
 VILLAGE 2  36.283*** 
 VILLAGE 3  33.086** 
 VILLAGE 4  37.997*** 
 VILLAGE 5  13.127 
 VILLAGE 6  13.544 
 VILLAGE 7  11.359 
 VILLAGE 8  51.378*** 
…………………………….   
 VILLAGE 78  18.395 
 VILLAGE 79  25.007 
 VILLAGE 80  25.110* 
 VILLAGE 81  54.984*** 
 VILLAGE 82  46.383*** 
 VILLAGE 83  53.133*** 
 VILLAGE 84  55.739*** 
   
Goodness of Fit   R
2
 within    0.545 
   R
2
 between 0.249 
 R
2
  0.416 R
2
 overall 0.409 
   Test of 
equality of 
VILLAGE 
coefficients 
 
F84,343=4.12*** 
~<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
 TABLE 3. Regression of Student Mathematics Achievement on Socioeconomic Controls, 
Village Controls, and Village Predictors (n students=436; n villages=85) 
Data Source: GSCF-1, 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
STUDENT-LEVEL SOCIOECONOMIC CONTROL VARIABLES 
 GRADE 2 16.645*** 16.068*** 15.713*** 15.745*** 15.347*** 15.419*** 
 GRADE 3 47.657*** 47.460*** 47.105** 46.856*** 46.431*** 46.546*** 
 AGE -8.412 -6.899 -5.615 -6.374 -4.986 -4.973 
 AGE-SQUARED 0.389 0.310 0.240 0.296 0.222 0.220 
 GENDER 0.020 -0.020 0.043 0.008 0.074 0.051 
 LOG FAMILY 
WEALTH 
1.578 1.568 1.323 1.520 1.264 1.278 
 DAYS ABS -1.632~ -1.558~ -1.498~ -1.652~ -1.601~ -1.630~ 
 BOOKS 
 
0.125~ 0.126~ 0.112~ 0.122 0.108 0.110~ 
VILLAGE-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES 
  L VIL POP  4.167 4.965~ 5.018 5.827* 5.825* 
 VIL TOP   12.050** 14.339*** 12.301*** 14.481*** 14.776*** 
 LGOVPPE 
 
  0.996 -0.025 1.305 1.320 
VILLAGE-LEVEL PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
 LNGOVPPE   2.960**  2.895** 4.736 
 COMMUNITY 
CLOSURE 
   16.059* 16.147* 19.447* 
 
INTERACTION  
LNGOVPPE*CLOSURE       -2.366 
 Goodness 
of   
 Fit  
R
2
 within    0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544 0.544 
        R
2
 
between 
0.256 0.326 0.374 0.367 0.415 0.416 
 R
2
 overall 0.412 0.444 0.467 0.459 0.481 0.481 
   
~<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
FIGURE 2 . Fitted Mathematics Achievement as a function of Village School Per 
Pupil Expenditure Funded by Nongovernmental Resources and Village Social 
Capital for a Prototypical Female Student, age 10, and is in Grade 3* 
(n students=436, n villages=85) 
Fi
tte
d 
M
at
he
m
at
ics
 
Sc
or
e
village social capital
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Fi
tte
d 
M
at
he
m
at
ics
 
Sc
or
e
Fi
tte
d 
M
at
he
m
at
ics
 
Sc
or
e
Fi
tte
d 
M
at
he
m
at
ics
 
Sc
or
e
 
 
 
* The student has not been absent from school in the last semester, and purchased the 
mean number of books during this period. She lives in a small village in the mountains or 
plains and her school, like many village primary schools, does not receive funding from 
the state. 
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